

Predictive Policing

Data, Discretion, and the Future
of Policing

Courts, Corrections, and Justice Committee
September 27th, 2023

Sarah Brayne
Associate Professor of Sociology
University of Texas at Austin



Level Setting: Definitions

Big data: 3 Vs (Volume, Variety, and Velocity)

Algorithm: formally specified set of instructions used to analyze data and automate decisions

Artificial Intelligence: capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior

Machine learning: subfield of artificial intelligence that gives computers the ability to learn without explicitly being programmed (can be “supervised” or “unsupervised”)


E.g., natural language processing, neural networks, deep learning

Predictive policing: the use of data to predict when and where crime is more likely to occur in the future, and who is likely to be involved

the computational analysis of massive and diverse datasets to automate decisions and make predictions.

Focus: Policing

- Feeder into criminal justice system
- Reforms targeted at policing phase can be very impactful because they cascade into other phases of criminal justice system



PREDICT AND SURVEIL

DATA, DISCRETION, AND THE
FUTURE OF POLICING

SARAH BRAYNE

Fieldwork

- **Los Angeles Police Department**
 - Area divisions
 - Specialized divisions: Robbery-Homicide, Information Technology, Fugitive Warrants, Records and Identification, Juvenile, Risk Management, Air Support
 - RACR
 - Ride-alongs
- **LA County Sheriff's Department**
- **JRIC**
- **PredPol**
- **Palantir**
- **Surveillance industry conferences**
- **Training manuals**








12440



The National Network



- ◆ State Fusion Center
- ◆ Major Urban Area Fusion Center



Homeland
Security

The state has long used data for governance. What's new?

- The state has long used data to govern its citizens
- Recently, state actors relying more heavily on private vendors
- Privatization brought the logic of risk, actuarial calculations
- Police use data for: 1) Efficiency; 2) Accountability and Legitimacy



CRIME AT A GLANCE: MARKING A MAP WITH COLOURED FLAGS IN THE NEW MAP ROOM AT SCOTLAND YARD.

FIGURE 2.1 Crime pin maps at Scotland Yard, 1947
Copyright: Illustrated London News Ltd/Mary Evans




Inside a CompStat meeting. Photo: Bryan R. Smith/The New York Times/Redux



Police use big data to conduct two different kinds of surveillance

1. **Dragnet:** surveillance of everyone, rather than just those under suspicion
2. **Directed:** surveillance of people and places deemed suspicious



Advanced Person Search

Coverage | Help?

Last Name First Name Middle Name

Include similar-sounding names ⓘ Strict Search ⓘ Include name variations ⓘ
 Include Full Address History ⓘ

DOB SSN

Street Address City State

ZIP Code Radius (miles)

Hide Additional Subject Information Fields ⓘ

Driver License # Driver License State ⓘ County Age Min - Age Max

Other Last Name Other City Other State ⓘ Other State ⓘ

Relative First Name Other Relative First Name

Search Clear Form

Reference

Important:
The Public Records and commercially available data sources used in this system have errors. Data is sometimes entered poorly, processed incorrectly and is generally not free from defect.
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- New Social Media Locator Search
- Important Security enhancement - Multi Factor Authentication
- Important Security Message
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Predictive policing

- Location based: to predict property crime
- Person based: to predict violent crime

Division PredPol

April 12th, 2015 / Watch 2 & 4

All Crime Types

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| PB Near 11900 Lopez Canyon Rd | PC Near 12700 Van Nuys Bl | PD Near Glenoaks & Pearce |
| PE Near 10800 Glenoaks Bl | PF Near Osborne St & Glenoaks Bl | PG Near Laurel Canyon & Paxton |
| PH Near 10455 Laurel Canyon Bl | PI Near Laurel Canyon Bl & Van Nuys Bl | PJ Near Remick Ave & Van Nuys Bl |
| PK Near 12653 Osborne St | PL Near 9801 Laurel Canyon Bl | PM Near 9725 Laurel Canyon Bl |






FIGURE 4.4 PredPol printout
SOURCE: LAPD; rendering by David Hallangen

Algorithmic bias

- Systematic errors that lead to unfair outcomes
- If training data is biased, so too will the outcomes be biased
- Feedback loop/self-fulfilling prophecy
- Why might crime data be biased?

Person-based predictive policing

- 5 points for violent crime
- 5 points for gang affiliation
- 5 points for prior arrest w/ handgun
- 5 points for parole/probation
- *1 point for every police contact*



OP. LIC. NO.		STATE	NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)			SUFFIX (JR, ETC.)	
O	F		N		J		
RESIDENCE ADDRESS		CITY	STATE	SEX	DESCENT	HAIR	EYES
A	C		S		D	H	E
HEIGHT	WEIGHT	BIRTHDATE	CLOTHING				
T	W	B					
PERSONAL ODDITIES					PHONE NO.		
BUSINESS ADDRESS/SCHOOL/UNION AFFIL.					SOC. SEC. NO.		
					Z		
MONIKER/ALIAS			GANG/CLUB				
SUBJ		1 LOITERER	3 SOLICITOR	5 GANG ACTIVITY	7 ON PAROLE	<input type="checkbox"/> DRIVER	
INFO		2 PROWLER	4 WITNESS	6 HAS RECORD	8 ON PROBATION	<input type="checkbox"/> PASSENGER	
V	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	TYPE	COLOR	VEH. LIC. NO.	TYPE STATE
E	INT COLOR	I	1 BUCKET SEAT	E	1 CUST. WHEELS	3 LEVEL ALTER	5 CUST. PAINT
H	T	2 DAMAGED INSIDE	X	2 PAINTED MURAL	4 RUST/PRIMER	6 VINYL TOP	
BODY		1 DAMAGE	3 STICKER	4 LEFT	6 FRONT	WIN-DOWS	1 DAMAGE 3 CURTAINS 4 LEFT 6 FRONT
		2 MODIFIED	5 RIGHT	7 REAR			2 CUST. TINT 5 RIGHT 7 REAR

Persons with subject			
NAME (LAST, FIRST)	DOB	SEX	GANG/MONIKER
NAME (LAST, FIRST)	DOB	SEX	GANG/MONIKER
SUBJECT'S BIRTHPLACE:	CITY	COUNTY	STATE COUNTRY
ADDITIONAL INFO (ADDITIONAL PERSONS, BOOKING NO., NARRATIVE, ETC.)			
DATE	TIME	LOCATION	RD
OFFICER	SERIAL NO.	OFFICER	SERIAL NO.
FIELD INTERVIEW	INCIDENT NO.	DIVISION	DETAIL SUPV. INITS.
15.43.00 (11/03)			

"Yesterday this individual might have got stopped because he jaywalked. Today, he mighta got stopped because he didn't use his turn signal or whatever the case might be. So that's two points...you could conduct an investigation or if something seems out of place you have your consensual stops. 'Hey, can I talk to you for a moment?' 'Yeah what's up?' You know, and then you just start filling out your card as he answers questions or whatever. And what it was telling us is who is out on the street, you know, who's out there not necessarily maybe committing a crime, but who's active on the streets. You put the activity of...being in a street with maybe their violent background and one and one might create the next crime that's gonna occur."

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



DIVISION
Chronic Offender List
Monday, April 13, 2015



Thompson, Stephen James AKA: LIL GHOUL 26
A12345678 Unit(s) Assigned: GED
1/17/1984 Laser-1
Primary Gang: 12th Street



Smith, John 25
A11234567 Unit(s) Assigned: GED
2/20/1991 Laser-1
Wanted For: Warrant - Arrest Felony
Status: Summary Probation



Matthews, Brian AKA: BOSS HAWG 22
A11123456 Unit(s) Assigned: GED
10/16/1985 Laser-1
Primary Gang: Hawg Boyz
Wanted For: Warrant - Arrest Felon, Warrant - Misd
Status: Parole



Davis, Carl 21
A11112345 Unit(s) Assigned: SPU
2/22/1950 Laser-1
Primary Gang: 12th Street
Status: Formal Probation



Jones, Douglas 21
A11111234 Unit(s) Assigned: GED
11/19/1994 Laser-1
Status: Summary Probation



Watts, Mark 21
A11111123 Unit(s) Assigned: GED
10/1/1993 Laser-1
Status: Formal Probation





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NAME: Thompson, Stephen James
DOB: 12/10/1984
CI#: A12345678

CDL#: D1234567



123 W. 12TH STREET, LOS ANGELES, CA, 90009
456 W. 78TH STREET, LOS ANGELES, CA, 90009

SEX: M
HAIR: BLK **HEIGHT:** 602
EYES: BRN **WEIGHT:** 205

PHYSICAL ODDITIES:
TATTOO ON RIGHT HAND "12"
TATTOO ON LEFT HAND "GJ"
TATTOO ON RIGHT ARM "ONE"
TATTOO ON LEFT ARM "DEUCE"
TATTOO ON RIGHT ARM "LIL GHOUL"

ARREST:
211, ADW, 10851 VC AND BURGLARY, GRAND THEFT
PERSON, NARCOTICS (POSS. CONT. SUBS. FOR SALE),
CRIMINAL THREATS

CALGANGS:
12TH STREET GANGSTER WITH MONIKER OF "LIL GHOUL,
LIL GJ"

PAROLE:
NONE

PROBATION:
NONE

WARRANTS:
NONE

VEHICLES:
1995 HONDA ACCORD 4D WHI CA-1ABC123
DRIVER 01/02/2010
2001 TOYOTA CAMRY 4D BLK CA-2CD456
DRIVER 04/05/2011

RECENT STOP:
OFFICERS: SMITH #12345 / CARSON #67890

DATE: 06/07/2013
LOCATION: 12TH ST/MAIN ST

RD: 1234
NARRATIVE/NO: PED STOP POSSIBLE ROBBERY
SUSPECTS, WANT AND WARRANT CHECK. SELF ADMITTED
12TH STREET GANGSTER WITH MONIKER OF "LIL GHOUL."
QUESTIONED AND RELEASED.

ASSOCIATES: STUART, DAVID (10/20/1987) "LIL MASK"
HOUSEMAN, MICHAEL (11/30/1984)

POLICE CONTACTS IN/NEAR DIVISION:		
DATE	RD	LOCATION/DISPOSITION
04/05/2010	1234	12TH PL/MAIN
06/07/2010	5678	PS/CONSENT Q&R
08/09/2011	1234	T/S FOR EXPIRED REG STOPPED FOR PED IN ROADWAY

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POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prepared by: <A. BROWN, SERIAL # 12345 > Crime Intelligence Detail (123) 456-7890 Date: 1/02/2012

“The Code of Federal Regulations. They say you shouldn’t create a— you can’t target individuals especially for any race or I forget how you say that. But we didn’t want to make it look like we’re creating a gang depository of just gang affiliates or gang associates...we were just trying to cover and make sure everything is right on the front end.”

Big data policing harder to challenge

- Looks objective
- Algorithmic opacity
- Trade secrecy



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
Bulletins



Tips




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
Big data policing is wider and deeper

- Includes a broader swath of people
- Can follow any single individual across a greater range of institutional settings, including those with no police contact

Using big data to police the police?

- Digital policing leaves digital trails
- Potential to police the police?

Resistance varied along two axes



Implications for social inequality

- Reduce existing inequalities?
 1. Less biased predictions of risk (humans as cognitive misers)
 2. Police the police
- Reinforce existing inequalities?

Implications for social inequality

- Reduce existing inequalities?
- Reinforce existing inequalities?
 1. Deepen surveillance of individuals already under suspicion
while appearing to be objective

Implications for social inequality

- Reduce existing inequalities?
- Reinforce existing inequalities?
 1. Deepen surveillance of individuals already under suspicion *while appearing to be objective*
 2. Widen CJ dragnet unequally along lines of race, class, neighborhood

Implications for social inequality

- Reduce existing inequalities?
- Reinforce existing inequalities?
 1. Deepen surveillance of individuals already under suspicion *while appearing to be objective*
 2. Widen CJ dragnet unequally along lines of race, class, neighborhood
 3. Lead people to avoid surveilling institutions fundamental to social integration

Table 2. Logistic Regression Predicting Institutional Avoidance

	Avoided Surveilling Institutions						Avoided Non-surveilling Institutions			
	Medical Care		Bank Account		School/Work		Volunteer		Religious Group	
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Any Criminal Justice Contact	1.309*** (.017)		1.186** (.068)		1.314*** (.101)		.906 (.049)		1.084 (.072)	
Stopped		1.332*** (.096)		.939 (.076)		1.198 (.130)		.920 (.064)		.994 (.086)
Arrested		1.293** (.119)		1.294** (.124)		1.302* (.162)		.932 (.089)		1.141 (.135)
Convicted		1.331** (.128)		1.535*** (.153)		1.304* (.169)		.867 (.089)		1.238 (.167)
Incarcerated		1.102 (.195)		1.509* (.273)		2.181*** (.426)		.732 (.149)		1.410 (.369)
Sociodemographic Controls	Yes†	Yes†	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes‡	Yes‡
Behavioral Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	14,458	14,411	14,515	14,468	14,167	14,120	14,510	14,463	14,400	14,354
Pseudo R-squared	.071	.071	.207	.209	.089	.090	.095	.095	.283	.284

Note: All coefficients expressed as odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sociodemographic controls include sex, race, age, education, parental education, marital status, nativity, household configuration (i.e., number in household and whether individuals live with parents), military service, and whether respondents are in school or have a job. Behavioral controls include whether individuals self-report stealing over or under \$50, damaging property, carrying a gun or knife to school or work, stabbing someone, using cocaine or methamphetamine, selling drugs, or being in a gang, and whether respondents are classified as impulsive or candid.

†Includes controls for general health and possession of medical insurance.

‡Includes controls for religiosity and regular church attendance.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 3. Effect of Criminal Justice Treatment on Matched Samples

Avoidance	Propensity Score Matching						Doubly Robust Estimation			
	Treated	Controls	Difference	SE	T-stat	Significance	OR	SE	N	Pseudo R ²
Surveilling Institutions										
Medical care	.321	.282	.039	.019	2.070	<i>p</i> < .05	1.186*	.096	3,148	.057
Bank account	.410	.301	.109	.019	5.620	<i>p</i> < .001	1.704***	.146	3,160	.191
School/work	.157	.126	.031	.014	2.170	<i>p</i> < .05	1.321*	.144	3,088	.096
Non-surveilling Institutions										
Volunteer	.748	.753	-.005	.018	-.280	n.s.	.951	.083	3,162	.087
Religious groups	.837	.818	.018	.016	1.160	n.s.	1.176	.129	3,134	.249

Note: Models include same suite of sociodemographic and behavioral controls as in Models 6 through 15. Sociodemographic controls include sex, race, age, education, parental education, marital status, nativity, household configuration, military service, and whether respondents are in school or have a job. Behavioral controls include whether individuals self-report stealing over or under 50 dollars, damaging property, carrying a gun or knife to school or work, stabbing someone, using coke or meth, selling drugs, or being in a gang, and whether respondents are classified as impulsive or candid. In light of cross-sectional results, criminal justice treatment is defined as arrested, convicted, or incarcerated, although results remain substantially unchanged when stopped is included, with one exception—bank account is only marginally significant at the *p* < .1 level.

p* < .05; *p* < .01; ****p* < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Table 4. Individual-Level Fixed-Effects Logistic Regressions Predicting Institutional Avoidance

	Avoided Surveilling Institutions						Avoided Non-surveilling Institutions			
	Medical Care ^a		Bank Acct.		Work		Volunteer		Religious Group ^b	
	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25
Any Criminal Justice Contact	1.478*** (.115)		1.904*** (.417)		1.411*** (.147)		.915 (.178)		1.067 (.093)	
Arrested		1.359** (.14)		1.827*** (.406)		1.287 (.185)		.807 (.216)		1.025 (.121)
Convicted		1.345* (.174)				1.011 (.169)		1.052 (.343)		.841 (.136)
Incarcerated		1.588*** (.160)		1.702 (.842)		1.750*** (.224)		.892 (.226)		1.247 (.144)
Wave fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	7,620	7,574	2,753	2,753	4,422	4,396	16,576	16,426	6,910	6,882
Pseudo <i>R</i> -squared	.069	.069	.092	.092	.137	.137	.87	.869	.106	.108

Note: All coefficients expressed as odds ratios. Models 16, 17, and 20 through 25 estimated using Add Health; Models 18 and 19 estimated using NLSY97. Standard errors are in parentheses.

^aModels include controls for general health and possession of health insurance.

^bModels include controls for religiosity and church attendance.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Implications for law

1. Pacing problem
2. Unsettles underlying legal categories (e.g., individualized suspicion, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, what constitutes a search)
3. Data are different in kind, not just degree
4. New opportunities for parallel construction

Nothing to hide, nothing to fear?

Takeaways

- 1) Algorithms do not transcend, but rather are shaped by the social world in which they are created and used.
- 2) Tradeoffs that are not made explicitly are inevitably made implicitly (e.g., fairness, accuracy, transparency, simplicity, privacy). Being explicit and quantifying our values is uncomfortable but necessary. It will allow us to measure progress.
- 3) Data does not *replace*, but rather *displaces* discretion to earlier, less visible, and therefore potentially less accountable phases of the policing process.
- 4) Relevant to other parts of the criminal justice system and beyond

Other data and criminal justice projects

- 1) Use of social media data in criminal cases
- 2) Civilian use of "smart" surveillance tech

Thank you

Questions/comments: sbrayne@utexas.edu

Supplemental slides

Table 1. Framework for Analyzing Big Data Surveillance across Institutional Contexts

	<i>Goals</i>		<i>Means</i>		<i>Ends</i>	
<i>Types of Surveillance</i>	<i>Institutional Field</i>	<i>Relationship between Individual and Institution</i>	<i>Shifts in Surveillance Practices Associated with Big Data</i>		<i>Institutional Interventions</i>	<i>Consequences for Inequality</i>
Categorical Suspicion	Criminal justice, intelligence	Classifying individuals according to risk; potential as criminals/terrorists	1) Discretionary to quantified risk assessment	2) Explanatory to predictive analytics	Marking, apprehension, social control	Stigma, spillover into other institutions
Categorical Seduction	Finance, marketing, credit	Classifying individuals according to their value to companies; potential as customers	3) Query-based to alert-based systems	4) Moderate to low inclusion thresholds	Different products, perks, access to credit, opportunities, constraints	Upward or downward economic mobility; reproducing current patterns
Categorical Care	Medical care, public assistance	Classifying individuals according to their need; potential as clients	5) Disparate to integrated data		Personalized medicine, welfarist service delivery	May reduce inequality except when intersects with suspicion or seduction