

Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office

Evolution of Law Enforcement Strategies

*The medical photograph of Province Photograp

Adapting Strategies

Legal and Privacy perspectives



State's considerations



Retention

The New Mexico administrative code:

a. Nuccional Mexico and Disposition is should be 15 of 24 MeX;

3.12.835 6.91504CE

C. desires I views have disposed of the Riscal view in which Tille above.

3.12.835 6.9395 MEXICO.

TOST stales - NMSA 41-4-19

Evolution of Law Enforcement Strategies

~From Traditional Policing to Precision Policing~

Since the 1950s, advancements in technology have driven significant progress in how law enforcement agencies identify criminal suspects and analyze crime trends.

From CompStat to hotspot policing and intelligence-led approaches, modern strategies increasingly leverage data and analytics to enhance crime prevention and resource allocation.



~Ethical and moral obligation to address concerns~

Limitations: Less than effective for identifying root causes of crime or identifying criminal trends. Can create a revolving door effect, where the same crime type or offender repeatedly impact our

Limitations: Creates concerns surrounding privacy, profiling and community trust if not implemented with transparency and accountability. ~This leads us to the question~

How can law enforcement enhance accountability and transparency while staying compliant with federal law and case law, while actively supporting victims and women's rights?

Respect legal and privacy constraints.

Examining our approach.

~From Traditional Policing to Precision Policing~

Since the 1950s, advancements in technology have driven significant progress in how law enforcement agencies identify criminal suspects and analyze crime trends.

From CompStat to hotspot policing and intelligence-led approaches, modern strategies increasingly leverage data and analytics to enhance crime prevention and resource allocation.

Tradional policing

Focus: Primarily reactive

Approach: Conduct regular patrols

Data use: Limited, used for record keeping and tracking past incidents

Success Metrics: measured by arrests, response times and volume of citations

Strengths: Effective for quickly responding to incidents and visible presence reassures community

Intelligence Led polici

Focus: Proactive and data driven

Approach: Data and intelligence- shar identifying repeat offenders.

Data use: Heavy use of data and analyt from several sources

Success Metrics: reducing crime rates effective interdiction and prevented outcomes

Strengths: Efficent resource allocation prevention through network distrupti

~Ethical and moral obligation to address conce

Vs.

Limitations: Less than effective for identifying 'root causes' of crime or identifying criminal trends. Can create a revolving door effect, where the same crime type or offender repeatedly impact our communities

Limitations: Creates concerns surrounding privacy, profiling and community trust if no implemented with *transparency and accountability*.

Tradional policing

Focus: Primarily reactive

Approach: Conduct regular patrols

Data use: Limited, used for record keeping and tracking past incidents

Success Metrics: measured by arrests, response times and volume of citations

Strengths: Effective for quickly responding to incidents and visible presence reassures community

Intelligence Led policing

Focus: Proactive and data driven

Vs.

Approach: Data and intelligence- sharing and identifying repeat offenders.

Data use: Heavy use of data and analytics from several sources

Success Metrics: reducing crime rates, effective interdiction and prevented outcomes

Strengths: Efficent resource allocation, crime prevention through network distruption.

~Ethical and moral obligation to address concerns~

Limitations: Less than effective for identifying 'root causes' of crime or identifying criminal trends. Can create a revolving door effect, where the same crime type or offender repeatedly impact our communities

Limitations: Creates concerns surrounding privacy, profiling and community trust if not implemented with *transparency and accountability*.

~Ethical and moral obligation to address concerns~

Limitations: Less than effective for identifying 'root causes' of crime or identifying criminal trends. Can create a revolving door effect, where the same crime type or offender repeatedly impact our communities

Limitations: Creates concerns surrounding privacy, profiling and community trust if not implemented with *transparency and accountability*.



~This leads us to the question~

How can law enforcement enhance accountability and transparency while staying compliant with federal law and case law, while actively supporting victims and women's rights?

Respect legal and privacy constraints.

Examining our approach.

Adapting Strategies

Over policing v precision

Over policing refers to the practice of disproportionately high levels of police presence, surveillance, and enforcement actions in certain communities, often marginalized or minority populations.

Disproportionate surveillance Frequent Stops & searches

> Aggressive policing tactics

Negative impact on community relations

~Precision Policing~

Law enforcement strategy that aims to focus resources on specific high-risk individuals, locations, and behaviors rather than broad, generalized enforcement across entire communities. This approach uses data and intelligence to "precisely" target the most significant drivers of crime, such as repeat offenders, gang networks, or crime hotspots, with the goal of reducing crime without unnecessary enforcement in low-risk areas.

Data driven focus

Community partnership

Focused enforcement

Problem solving approach



Over policing v precision

Over policing refers to the practice of disproportionately high levels of police presence, surveillance, and enforcement actions in certain communities, often marginalized or minority populations.

Frequent Stops & searches

Disproportionate surveillance

Aggressive policing tactics

Negative impact on community relations

~Precision Policing~

Law enforcement strategy that aims to focus resources on specific high-risk individuals, locations, and behaviors rather than broad, generalized enforcement across entire communities. This approach uses data and intelligence to "precisely" target the most significant drivers of crime, such as repeat offenders, gang networks, or crime hotspots, with the goal of reducing crime without unnecessary enforcement in low-risk areas.



Increasing Transparency and Accountability

Clear Data Collection policies

Community Input

Audit Trails and accountability in usage

Data Sharing based on guidelines

~Other Factors~

Public Transparency

Enhanced training and internal policies

Legal and Privacy perspectives

Overlapping regulations and case law

Regulations

Title 28 CFR Part 23-

Specifically, it sets standards and guidelines for how information is collected, maintained, and shared within these systems to ensure they are used lawfully and ethically. Providing guidelines for Law Enforcement agencies to operate multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems.

Privacy Act of 1974-

Protect the privacy of individuals by regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information (PII) by federal agencies. It aims to balance the needs of the government to collect information for its operations with individuals' rights to privacy and control over their personal data.

Case law

Case Law

Case law

United States v. Jones (2012)-

Not specific to ALPRs', but discussed the use of a physical GPS tracking device placed onto a suspects' vehicle without a search warrant.

U.S. v. Garcia (2018)-

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the legality of using ALPRs in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the collection of license plate data through ALPRs, when used to track the movements of a vehicle in public areas, does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public space regarding license plates.

Kyllo v. United States (2001)-

Not specific to ALPRs', but discussed the use of a thermal imaging devices to monitor a home. Information which would require a search warrant because it should require physical intrusion. Information gathered was not readily available to the public.

Regulations

Overlapping regulations and case law

Regulations

Title 28 CFR Part 23-

Specifically, it sets standards and guidelines for how information is collected, maintained, and shared within these systems to ensure they are used lawfully and ethically. Providing guidelines for Law Enforcement agencies to operate multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems.

Privacy Act of 1974-

Protect the privacy of individuals by regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information (PII) by federal agencies. It aims to balance the needs of the government to collect information for its operations with individuals' rights to privacy and control over their personal data.

Un

track warra

U.S

ALPR the c track a sea expe

Kyl

imag requ intru publi

Case law

Overlapping regulations and case law

Regulations

Title 28 CFR Part 23-

Specifically, it sets standards and guidelines for how information is collected, maintained, and shared within these systems to ensure they are used lawfully and ethically. Providing guidelines for Law Enforcement agencies to operate multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems.

Privacy Act of 1974-

Protect the privacy of individuals by regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information (PII) by federal agencies. It aims to balance the needs of the government to collect information for its operations with individuals' rights to privacy and control over their personal data.

Maximum retention is 5 years.

At the end of the retention period records must be purged or revalidated and given a new retention period.

To be retained- submitting agency must determine if person is still reasonably suspected of criminal activity.

Case law

Cc

Uni

track warra

U.S

ALPR the c track a sea

Kyl

expe

imag requ intru publi

Overlapping regulations and case law

Regulations

Title 28 CFR Part 23-

Specifically, it sets standards and guidelines for how information is collected, maintained, and shared within these systems to ensure they are used lawfully and ethically. Providing guidelines for Law Enforcement agencies to operate multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems.

Privacy Act of 1974-

Protect the privacy of individuals by regulating the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information (PII) by federal agencies. It aims to balance the needs of the government to collect information for its operations with individuals' rights to privacy and control over their personal data.

The Act seeks to balance the need for government agencies to collect and use personal data with the fundamental right to privacy.

Maximum retention is 5 years.

At the end of the retention period records must be purged or revalidated and given a new retention period.

To be retained- submitting agency must determine if person is still reasonably suspected of criminal activity.

Un³

track warra

U.S

ALPF the c track a sea expe

Kyl

imag requ intru publ

Case law

Case Law

Case law

United States v. Jones (2012)-

Not specific to ALPRs', but discussed the use of a physical GPS tracking device placed onto a suspects' vehicle without a search warrant.

U.S. v. Garcia (2018)-

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the legality of using ALPRs in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the collection of license plate data through ALPRs, when used to track the movements of a vehicle in public areas, does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public space regarding license plates.

Kyllo v. United States (2001)-

Not specific to ALPRs', but discussed the use of a thermal imaging devices to monitor a home. Information which would require a search warrant because it should require physical intrusion. Information gathered was not readily available to the public.



State's considerations



Governor's Executive Order~ 2022-107

Protecting Access to Reproductive Health Care Services

Bernalillo County~ Sanctuary County (2017)

Bars the use of County money, resources or personnel from enforcing civil immigration laws.

New Mexico Courts

Historicially, NM courts have provided greater constitutional protections:

Long standing view- A person travelling in a vehicle on a public roadway has no reasonable expectation of privacy in thier movements from one place to another.

There is no distinction currently between a peace officer inputting an actual ticense plate number into an MVD database or a camera taking a picture and automatically running that plate through a law antecement database.

Specific Case lav

Maresca v. Bernaillo County-

Deputy Fuentes initated a traffic stop on a suspected stolen vehicle after mis-typing the license plate into NCIC by one digit. The vehicle was not stolen and inside was a family was returning from a hiking trip.

Disregarding training to double check the NCIC return, the family was detained during a high-risk traffic stop. There were no exigent circumstances which would have precluded not verifying the vehicles' status. This resulted in an excessive use of force District Court case.

Illinois ALPR data sharing

(625 ILCS 5/2-136

(b) An ALPR user shall not sell, share, allow access to, or transfer ALPR information to any state or local jurisdiction for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a law that:

 denies or inferferes with a person's right to choose or obtain reproductive health care services or an lawful health care services as defined by the Lawful Health Care Activity Act; or

(2) permits the detention or investigation of a person based on the person's immigration status.

Known relationship's

Violent crimes: (Robbery and aggravated assault) 50-60% of victims do not know thier assailant.

*Information from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), FBI Crime Statistics and National Crime Victim Survey (NCVS)

Property Crimes: (Burglary and vehicle theft) are most often committed by strangers and the suspect's identity remains unknown in most cases.

Homicides present varied statistics. In a significant portion of homicides, the victim and assailant have a prior relationship (often in domestic or interpersonal disputes). However, a substantial portion—particularly gangrelated or organized crime homicides—involve unknown assailants.



~Factors impacting homicide investigations~

For Homicide cases where the suspect information is not immediately developed, detectives rely on time specific geo-fenced search warrants to obtain CSLI.

This is a lengthy process often taking months to develop potential suspect identity.

~Factors impacting Field Operations~

Since majority of victims do not know thier assailant, deputies are left with descriptions and partial plate numbers.

Responding to in progress violent crimes deputies will often stop vehicles resembling those descriptions. In turn leading to over policing our community by contacting uninvolved persons.



Governor's Executive Order~ 2022-107

Protecting Access to Reproductive Health Care Services

Bernalillo County~ Sanctuary County (2017)

Bars the use of County money, resources or personnel from enforcing civil immigration laws.

New Mexico Courts

Historicially, NM courts have provided greater constitutional protections:

Long standing view- A person travelling in a vehicle on a public roadway has no reasonable expectation of privacy in thier movements from one place to another.

There is no distinction currently between a peace officer inputting an actual license plate number into an MVD database or a camera taking a picture and automatically running that plate through a law enforcement database.

Specific Case law

Maresca v. Bernaillo County~

Deputy Fuentes initated a traffic stop on a suspected stolen vehicle after mis-typing the license plate into NCIC by one digit. The vehicle was not stolen and inside was a family was returning from a hiking trip.

Disregarding training to double check the NCIC return, the family was detained during a high-risk traffic stop. There were no exigent circumstances which would have precluded not verifying the vehicles' status. This resulted in an excessive use of force District Court case.

Illinois ALPR data sharing

(625 ILCS 5/2-130):

(b) An ALPR user shall not sell, share, allow access to, or transfer ALPR information to any state or local jurisdiction for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a law that:

(1) denies or interferes with a person's right to choose or obtain reproductive health care services or an lawful health care services as defined by the Lawful Health Care Activity Act; or

(2) permits the detention or investigation of a person based on the person's immigration status.

New Mexico Courts

Historicially, NM courts have provided greater constitutional protections:

Long standing view- A person travelling in a vehicle on a public roadway has no reasonable expectation of privacy in thier movements from one place to another.

There is no distinction currently between a peace officer inputting an actual license plate number into an MVD database or a camera taking a picture and automatically running that plate through a law enforcement database.

Specific Case law

Maresca v. Bernaillo County~

Deputy Fuentes initated a traffic stop on a suspected stolen vehicle after mis-typing the license plate into NCIC by one digit. The vehicle was not stolen and inside was a family was returning from a hiking trip.

Disregarding training to double check the NCIC return, the family was detained during a high-risk traffic stop. There were no exigent circumstances which would have precluded not verifying the vehicles' status. This resulted in an excessive use of force District Court case.

Specific Case law

Maresca v. Bernaillo County~

ALPR data-

Must be considered an investigative lead only and vetted through an legitimate law enforcement investigation

Deputy Fuentes initated a traffic stop on a suspected stolen vehicle after mis-typing the license plate into NCIC by one digit. The vehicle was not stolen and inside was a family was returning from a hiking trip.

Disregarding training to double check the NCIC return, the family was detained during a high-risk traffic stop. There were no exigent circumstances which would have precluded not verifying the vehicles' status. This resulted in an excessive use of force District Court case.

Illinois ALPR data sharing

(625 ILCS 5/2-130):

- (b) An ALPR user shall not sell, share, allow access to, or transfer ALPR information to any state or local jurisdiction for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a law that:
- (1) denies or interferes with a person's right to choose or obtain reproductive health care services or an lawful health care services as defined by the Lawful Health Care Activity Act; or
- (2) permits the detention or investigation of a person based on the person's immigration status.

Illinois ALPR data sharing

(625 ILCS 5/2-130):

- (b) An ALPR user shall not sell, share, allow access to, or transfer ALPR information to any state or local jurisdiction for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a law that:
- (1) denies or interferes with a person's right to choose or obtain reproductive health care services or an lawful health care services as defined by the Lawful Health Care Activity Act; or
- (2) permits the detention or investigation of a person based on the person's immigration status.

Requirements-

Shall not share ALPR information with an out-of-state law enforcement agency without first obtaining a written declaration from the out-of-state law enforcement agency that it expressly affirms that ALPR information obtained shall not be used in a manner that violates subsection (b).


Known relationship's

Violent crimes: (Robbery and aggravated assault) 50-60% of victims do not know thier assailant.

*Information from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), FBI Crime Statistics and National Crime Victim Survey (NCVS)

Property Crimes: (Burglary and vehicle theft) are most often committed by strangers and the suspect's identity remains unknown in most cases.

Homicides present varied statistics. In a significant portion of homicides, the victim and assailant have a prior relationship (often in domestic or interpersonal disputes). However, a substantial portion—particularly gangrelated or organized crime homicides—involve unknown assailants.



~Factors impacting homicide investigations~

For Homicide cases where the suspect information is not immediately developed, detectives rely on time specific geo-fenced search warrants to obtain CSLI.

This is a lengthy process often taking months to develop potential suspect identity.

~Factors impacting Field Operations~

Since majority of victims do not know thier assailant, deputies are left with descriptions and partial plate numbers.


Responding to in progress violent crimes deputies will often stop vehicles resembling those descriptions. In turn leading to over policing our community by contacting uninvolved persons.

Violent crimes: (Robbery and aggravated assault) 50-60% of victims do not know thier assailant.

*Information from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), FBI Crime Statistics and National Crime Victim Survey (NCVS)

Property Crimes: (Burglary and vehicle theft) are most often committed by strangers and the suspect's identity remains unknown in most cases.

Homicides present varied statistics. In a significant portion of homicides, the victim and assailant have a prior relationship (often in domestic or interpersonal disputes). However, a substantial portion—particularly gangrelated or organized crime homicides—involve unknown assailants.



~Factors impacting homicide investigations~

For Homicide cases where the suspect information is not immediately developed, detectives rely on time specific geo-fenced search warrants to obtain CSLI.

This is a lengthy process often taking months to develop potential suspect identity.

~Factors impacting Field Operations~

Since majority of victims do not know thier assailant, deputies are left with descriptions and partial plate numbers.

Responding to in progress violent crimes deputies will often stop vehicles resembling those descriptions. In turn leading to over policing our community by contacting uninvolved persons.

The New Mexico administrative code:

a. Functional Retention and Disposition Schedule (1.21.2 NMAC)

1.21.2.933 EVIDENCE

C. destroy 3 years from the close of the fiscal year in which file closed.

1.21.2.938 SURVEILLANCE – LAW ENFORCEMENT C. Retention- destroy two years from the date file closed.

TORT claims- NMSA 41-4-15

The New Mexico administrative code:

a. Functional Retention and Disposition Schedule (1.21.2 NMAC)

1.21.2.933 EVIDENCE

C. destroy 3 years from the close of the fiscal year in which file closed.

1.21.2.938 SURVEILLANCE – LAW ENFORCEMENT C. Retention- destroy two years from the date file closed.

TORT claims- NMSA 41-4-15

The New Mexico administrative code:

a. Functional Retention and Disposition Schedule (1.21.2 NMAC)

1.21.2.933 EVIDENCE

C. destroy 3 years from the close of the fiscal year in which file closed.

1.21.2.938 SURVEILLANCE – LAW ENFORCEMENT C. Retention- destroy two years from the date file closed.

TORT claims- NMSA 41-4-15

The New Mexico administrative code:

a. Functional Retention and Disposition Schedule (1.21.2 NMAC)

1.21.2.933 EVIDENCE

C. destroy 3 years from the close of the fiscal year in which file closed.

1.21.2.938 SURVEILLANCE – LAW ENFORCEMENT C. Retention- destroy two years from the date file closed.

TORT claims- NMSA 41-4-15

The New Mexico administrative code:

a. Functional Retention and Disposition Schedule (1.21.2 NMAC)

1.21.2.933 EVIDENCE

C. destroy 3 years from the close of the fiscal year in which file closed.

1.21.2.938 SURVEILLANCE – LAW ENFORCEMENT C. Retention- destroy two years from the date file closed.

TORT claims- NMSA 41-4-15